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STATE OF’NEW YORK 
SUPFEME COURT cowry OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of CHARLES UTSEY, 
ANDREA EVANS, Chairwoman, 
N.Y.S. BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Petitioner, 
Respandent; 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances: 
I .  
Supreme Cowt Albany County Arti~le 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresiet, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-13-ST4329 IndexNo. 6331-12 
Charles Uhey 
Inmate No. 11-A-3395 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Altma CorrectionaI Faci€ity 
555 Devils Den Road 
B.O. Box 3000 
Altona, NY 12910 
Eric T. Schneideman 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Laura A. Sprague, 
Assistrant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
George B , Ceresia, Jr#, Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Altona Correctional Facility, commenced the instant 
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated April 17,20 12 
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to deny him discretionary release on parole, Petitioner is serving a term of 1 113 to 4 years 
upon conviction of attempted robbery in the third degree. Among the many arguments set 
forth in the petition, the petitioner maintains that the determination was not made in 
accordance with the parole review procedures implemented in 20 1 1, which requires a risk 
and needs assessment (see Executive Law 2594 [4j). He argues that the reasons given for 
determination were conclwory. He contends that the Paroie Board erred in not providing 
guidance or additional reasons for its ruling. He points out that he received an earned 
eligibility certificate; and, as indicated during the paroIe interview, he intends to return to his 
pre-incarceration ernploynent upon release. He indicates that he has a spotless disciplinary 
record. He maintains that the Parole Board’s determination was based upon an improper 
standard of review, that his release must be in the best interest of society. In his view, the 
Parole Board erred in not questioning him about his prior criminal history, thereby precluding 
him from explaining his criminal past. In a related argument, he contends that the Parole 
Board improperly focused solely on his current offense and criminal past, to the exclusion 
of other factors. Petitioner asserts that the 24 month hold was excessive, beyond the release 
guideline range, and constitutes a re-sentencing, in violation of law. In his view the 
determination was irrational bordering on impropriety. The petitioner indicates that he has 
participated h institutional programs, including Parenthood and Anger Replacement. He was 
working as a gym porter at the time of the parole interview. He has worked in the Facility 
storehouse, worked as a recreation yard aid, and he completed his G.E.D. in July 2012. 
The reasom for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are set forth as follows: 
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“Parole is denied. Hold 24 months. Next Appearance 4/20 14. 
Despite an earned eligibility certificate, parole is denied. After 
a personal interview, record review and deliberation, it is the 
determination of this panel that, if released at this time, there is 
a reasonable probability that you would not live at liberty 
without violating the law. Your release at this time is 
incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community. 
You appeared before this panel for the serious instant offense of 
attempted robbery in the 3d degree. Your criminal record 
reflects prior unlawful behavior. This repeated unlawful 
behavior is a concern for this panel. Consideration has been 
given to an assessment of your risk and needs for success on 
parole. The panel also notes your programming, good 
disciplinary record, and release plans and your educational 
achievements. However, despite these accomplishments, when 
considering all relevant factors, discretionary release is not 
warranted.” 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept., 
200 I]). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention @ Matter of Sihon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York Stale Bd. of 
Parole, 50 W 2 d  69,77 [1980]; see also Matter of Graz,iano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,1369 
[3d Dept., 201 I]). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the 
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (E Matter of Perez v. New York 
State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
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parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner's possession of an earned eligibility certificate, his institutional 
programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release, including returning to his 
previous job at Crisifulli, where he worked for fifteen years, The Board inquired with regard 
to his family. The Board discussed with him a portion of the COMFAS ReEntry Nmt ive  
Assessment Summary developed pursuant to the provisions of Executive Law 8 259-c (4). 
The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the 
denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 (see Matter of 
Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773 [2008]; 201 AID2d 825 [3rd Dept., 
19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 
19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of 
the inmate's crimes and their violent nature Matter of Matos v New York State Board 
of Parole, 87 AD3d 1193 [3d Dept., 201 13; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd 
Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate's criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 
629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The 
Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it 
considered in determining the inmate's application, or to expressly discuss each one & 
Matter of MacKenzie v Evm, 95 AD3d 1613 [3d Dept., 20121; Matter of Matos v New 
York State Board of Parole, supra; Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 
AD3d 1681, 1681-1682 [3d Dept., 20101; Matter of Wise v New York State Division of 
Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3d Dept., 20081). Nor must the parole board recite the brecise statutory 
language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 5 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of 
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Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3d Dept., 20061). In other words, ‘‘[wlhere appropriate 
the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the 
circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s 
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the 
individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her 
‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate 
the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New 
York State Division of Parole, 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 
[23 [c] [A], other citations omitted). 
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a 
guaranteeof release (Matter of Dorman v New York State Board of Parole, 30 AD3d 880 [3d 
Dept., 20061; 25 AD3d 1058 [3d 
Dept . ,20061). 
Petitioner’s claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a 
resentencing, in violation of the double jeopardy clauses’s prohibition against multiple 
punishments are conclusory and without merit (E Matter of Bockeno v New York State 
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3d Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews vNew York State Executive 
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3d Dept., 20011; Matter of Evms v 
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 20061; Matter of Ralwasinski v Paterson, 
80 AD3d 1065,1066 [3dDept., 20111; Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD3d 1031,1031 [3d 
Dept., 201 13; Matter of Valentino v Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 [3d Dept., 20121). The fact that 
an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not confer upon the inmate a 
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protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 1 I 14, 
1 I15 [3d Dept., 200&]). The Parole Board is vested with the discretion to deterrnine whether 
release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the sentencing court set the minimum 
term of petitioner’s sentence (see 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000]; 
Matter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole, 87 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept., 201 I]; 
Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141,1142 [3d Dept., 20061 Iv denied 8 NY3d 802 
[2007J; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3d Dept., 20071). 
As relevant here, the 201 1 amendments to the Executive Law I, 20 I I ch 62, Part 
C, Subpart A, 5 33-b, et seq.) made two changes with respect to how parole determinations 
are made. First, Executive Law 9 259-c was revised to eliminate mention of Division of 
Parole guidelines 9 NYCFR 8001.3 [a]), in favor of requiring the Division ofParoIe to 
rely upon criteria that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates 
have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-fiee if 
released (see Executive Law 259-c [4]). Said section now recites: “[tlhe state board of 
parole shall [J (4) establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions its 
required by Iaw. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to 
measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success 
of such persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining 
which inmates may be released to parole supervision” (Executive Law 259-c [4], enacted in 
L 201 I ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 6 38-b). In the second change, Executive 2594 (2) (c) was 
amended to incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to 
consider in making release determhations (see L 20 1 I ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 5 28-f-1). 
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This amendment was effective immediately upon its adoption on March 3 I, 20 1 I (see L 
201 1, ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 8 49). However, it did not result in a substantive change in 
the criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its decision. 
With regard to petitioner’s arguments with respect to alleged the Parole Board’s nom 
compliance with Executive Law 6 259-c (4), as noted, the Parole Board had before it 
petitioner’s COMPAS ReEntry Narrative Assessment Summary dated April 9,20 12, which 
contained a comprehensive evaluation of his risk and needs. The Parole Board determination 
(sq@ expressly mentions consideration of petitioner’s risk and needs in rendering its 
determination. The Court frnds that the argument has no merit. 
The Parote Board‘s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 months) 
is Within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record @ Matter of Tatta v State 
of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604). 
Petitioner’s argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner a d o r  
provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he 
should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit 
I- see Executive Law Q 2594 121 [a]; 9 W C R R  Q 8002.3; Matter of Francis v New York State 
Division of Parole, 89 AD3d 13 12 [3d Dept,, 20 1 I]; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1 [2nd 
Cir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1174 [3rd 
Dept., ZOOS]). 
With respect to petitioner’s argument that he has served time in excess of the parole 
guideline m g e  &, 9 NYCRR 800 1,3), the guidelines “are intended only as a guide, and 
are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each 
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individual case” (see, 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division 
of Parole, 290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Rodrimez v Evans, 82 AD3d 
1.397 [3d Dept,, 20 1 11). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn 
the Board’s decision, 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of Zaw, irrational or arbiQaq and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in cumera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shaIl constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decisionlorderljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decisionlorderljudgment and delivery of this decisionlorderljudgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved fiom the applicable 




Dated: July ,2013 
Troy, New York George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
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4. 
Order To Show Cause dated December 2 I, 20 12, Petition, Supporting 
Papers and Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated February 28,2013, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
Petitioner’s Letter dated March 4,20 13 
Petitioner’s Letter dated June 6,2013 
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